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Abstract 
Autonomous weapon systems are often described either as more 
independent versions of weapons already in use or as humanoid robotic soldiers. 
In many ways, these analogies are useful. Analogies and allusions to popular 
culture make new technologies seem accessible, identify potential dangers, and 
buttress desired narratives. Most importantly from a legal perspective, analogical 
reasoning helps stretch existing law to cover developing technologies and 
minimize law-free zones. 
But all potential analogies—weapon, combatant, child soldier, animal 
combatant—fail to address the legal issues raised by autonomous weapon 
systems, largely because they all misrepresent legally salient traits. Conceiving of 
autonomous weapon systems as weapons minimizes their capacity for 
independent and self-determined action, while the combatant, child soldier, and 
animal combatant comparisons overemphasize it. Furthermore, these discrete and 
embodied analogies limit our ability to think imaginatively about this new 
technology and anticipate how it might develop, thereby impeding our ability to 
properly regulate it. 
We cannot simply graft legal regimes crafted to regulate other entities 
onto autonomous weapon systems. Instead, as is often the case when analogical 
reasoning cannot justifiably stretch extant law to answer novel legal questions, 
new supplemental law is needed. The sooner we escape the confines of these 
insufficient analogies, the sooner we can create appropriate and effective 
regulations for autonomous weapon systems. 
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 Henry V:  “An otter, Sir John. Why an otter?” 
  Falstaff:  “Why, she’s neither fish nor flesh: a  
  man knows not where to have her.”1 
 
Introduction 
Autonomous weapon systems are usually depicted in one of two ways.2 At 
times, they are discussed as more independent versions of weapons already in 
use—say, autonomous drones or smarter sea mines. Alternatively, they are 
portrayed as robotic soldiers or humanoid “killer robots,” conjuring images of the 
Terminator.3 These comparisons are useful: analogies to existing weaponry and 
allusions to popular culture make the incomprehensible seem accessible, highlight 
potential dangers, and buttress desired narratives.4 Analogical reasoning also 
helps stretch existing law to cover developing technologies and minimize law-free 
zones.5 
                                                 
1 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY IV, PART I, act. 3, sc. 3. 
2 An “autonomous weapon system” is “a weapon system that, based on conclusions derived from 
gathered information and preprogrammed constraints, is capable of independently selecting and 
engaging targets.” Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy Implications, 
36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1837, 1842 (2015); see also U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 3000.09, 
AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS 13–14 (2012) (defining “autonomous weapon systems” as ones 
which, “once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human 
operator”). The term “autonomous weapon system” encourages the use of the weapon analogy, but 
I use it for the sake of consistency with the existing literature. A better term might simply be 
“autonomous agent.” Cf. Alessandro Guarino, Autonomous Intelligent Agents in Cyber Offence, in 
5TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYBER CONFLICT: PROCEEDINGS (K. Podins, J. Stinissen & 
M. Maybaum eds., 2013). 
3 HUM. RTS. WATCH & INT’L HUM. RTS. CLINIC, HARV. L. SCH., LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE 
AGAINST KILLER ROBOTS 38 (2012) [hereinafter LOSING HUMANITY] (suggesting that 
“emotionless robotic warriors” would be more likely to harm civilians and obey repressive 
autocrats); see also THE TERMINATOR (Orion Pictures 1984) (portraying a ruthless cyborg 
assassin, sent on a mission by Skynet, a self-aware artificial superintelligence intent on eliminating 
humanity).  
4 An ongoing difficulty in discussions of how best to regulate autonomous weapon systems is that 
the term means different things to different people. See, e.g., Paul Scharre (@paul_scharre), 
TWITTER (Aug. 31, 2017, 10:00 AM), 
https://twitter.com/paul_scharre/status/903301434468442114 [https://perma.cc/QH2M-JJMC] 
(“[T]he term ‘autonomous weapon’ conjures up wildly different images for people. Some envision 
a Roomba w/ a gun. Others see Terminators.”). At present, there is still no agreed-upon 
international definition. UNIDIR, THE WEAPONIZATION OF INCREASINGLY AUTONOMOUS 
TECHNOLOGIES: CONCERNS, CHARACTERISTICS AND DEFINITIONAL APPROACHES 19–21 (2017) 
(outlining the three main definitional approaches). This lack of clarity encourages reliance on 
sometimes fanciful and inappropriate analogies. 
5 Neil M. Richards & William D. Smart, How Should the Law Think About Robots?, in ROBOT 
LAW 3, 17 (Ryan Calo, A. Michael Froomkin & Ian Kerr eds., 2016) (“Particularly in the context 
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However, the weapon and combatant analogies for autonomous weapon 
systems are at odds with each other, insofar as they implicate distinct regulatory 
regimes. Weapons are inherently lawful or unlawful;6 combatants may act 
lawfully or unlawfully.7 Accordingly, the law of weapons regulates their physical 
design and capabilities, while the law governing combatants attempts to direct or 
constrain their behavior through a combination of training and accountability 
mechanisms.  
Given this distinction, selecting the weapon or combatant analogy will 
predetermine the answers to many troubling legal questions, as that decision 
entails selecting between different standards for lawful use. Consider the 
customary requirement that parties to a conflict must distinguish between lawful 
targets (combatants, civilians directly participating in hostilities, and military 
objectives) and unlawful targets (civilians, surrendering or wounded combatants, 
and civilian objects).8 Autonomous weapon systems may be used in a 
discriminate manner,9 but they are not capable of independently distinguishing 
between lawful and unlawful targets, as would be expected of a combatant.10 
Under the weapons rubric, autonomous weapon systems are lawful because they 
may be lawfully used; under the law regulating combatants, they (currently) 
cannot be expected to act lawfully.11 Using one analogy, deploying autonomous 
weapon systems is lawful; using the other, it is not. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
of changing technologies, the law almost always considers new technology as merely a new form 
of something else.”). 
6 Granted, weapons that may be lawfully used in one manner or battlefield environment may be 
prohibited in others. 
7 For the purposes of this paper, “combatants” entails members of the armed forces of a party to a 
conflict, all of whom are required to act in accordance with international humanitarian law. See 
Rule 3. Definition of Combatants, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule3 (last visited Mar. 20, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/RY4X-9MRG]. The question of whether an individual is a “lawful” or 
“unlawful” combatant is relevant only in the context of determining whether that individual 
qualifies for prisoner of war status upon capture. 
8 This customary rule is codified in multiple treaties, but most notably in Article 48 of the First 
Additional Protocol. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 48, 
adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter First Additional Protocol].  
9 Crootof, supra note 2, at 1874–76 (arguing that autonomous weapon systems may be used in 
compliance with the distinction requirement); Michael N. Schmitt, Autonomous Weapon Systems 
and International Humanitarian Law: A Reply to the Critics, HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. FEATURES (Feb. 
5, 2013), at 10–13 (same). 
10 Crootof, supra note 2, at 1873–74 (“At present, most agree that autonomous weapon systems 
are incapable of distinguishing between combatants and civilians. Doing so requires a complicated 
assessment of various factors, and there are many gray zones that bewilder even well-trained 
human soldiers.”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL §6.5.9.3 (2015) (stating 
that the principle of proportionality applies to persons, not weapons) [hereinafter DOD MANUAL]. 
11 Whether autonomous weapon systems will ever be capable of distinguishing between lawful 
and unlawful targets on par with human beings is a matter of hypothetical debate. Roboticist 
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Both those arguing for and those skeptical of a ban on autonomous 
weapon systems often shift fluidly between the weapon and combatant analogies 
to advance their preferred narratives, further muddling an already confused 
conversation.12 Ban advocates utilize the combatant analogy to argue that “killer 
robots” will be incapable of complying with the law of targeting, cannot be held 
accountable for serious violations of international humanitarian law, and will be 
less moral than human soldiers (because they cannot empathize or show mercy).13 
Meanwhile, they simultaneously rely on the weapon analogy when arguing that 
autonomous weapon systems can be successfully banned, just as other weapons 
have been banned.14 Ban skeptics analogize autonomous weapon systems to other 
weapons, arguing that they may be used in compliance with the law of armed 
conflict, possibly in more discriminate ways that better protect both combatants 
and civilians.15 But they also utilize the combatant analogy to argue that 
autonomous weapon systems may well be more humane than human soldiers, 
insofar as they will not make mistakes due to hunger, fatigue, illness, or boredom, 
and they will not act out of anger or a desire for revenge or renown.16 
Granted, there are many circumstances where the best analogy for a given 
technology will shift depending on the legally salient characteristic of the issue 
being evaluated.17 It may be appropriate, for example, to consider the increasingly 
independent autonomous trucks now driving between Texas and California as 
“vehicles” in the context of evaluating whether speed limit laws apply, but as 
“drivers” or “employees” in evaluating which entity is liable should one hit a 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Ronald Arkin suggests that robots will be able to comply with the distinction requirement in as 
few as ten years. Don Troop, Robots at War: Scholars Debate the Ethical Issues, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC. (Sept. 10, 2012), http://chronicle.com/article/Moral-Robots-the-Future-of/134240. 
Roboticist Noel Sharkey does not believe that they will ever be able to do so. Noel E. Sharkey, 
The Evitability of Autonomous Robot Warfare, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 787, 788–89 (2012).  
12 For example, “[m]any questions regarding accountability stem from a blurring of the approach 
to [autonomous weapon systems], an approach that moves from treating them as tools to treating 
them as moral or legal agents.” HEATHER ROFF & RICHARD MOYES, MEANINGFUL HUMAN 
CONTROL, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, AND AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS 6 (2016), 
http://www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/MHC-AI-and-AWS-FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PP5P-2W7H] (briefing paper prepared for the Informal Meeting of Experts on 
Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons). In 
retrospect, I am also guilty of switching between analogies in my own writing. See Crootof, supra 
note 2, at 1866–68 (comparing autonomous weapon systems to both weapons and to human 
soldiers). 
13 See, e.g., LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 3. 
14 See, e.g., HUM. RTS. WATCH & INT’L HUM. RTS. CLINIC, HARV. L. SCH., PRECEDENT FOR 
PREEMPTION: THE BAN ON BLINDING LASERS AS A MODEL FOR A KILLER ROBOTS PROHIBITION 
(2015) [hereinafter PRECEDENT FOR PREEMPTION]. 
15 See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 9, at 25. 
16 See, e.g., Crootof, supra note 2, at 1867–68. 
17 Cf. Jack Balkin, The Path of Robotics Law, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 45, 46 (2015) (“When we 
consider how a new technology affects law, our focus should not be on what is essential about the 
technology but on what features of social life the technology makes newly salient.”). 
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car.18 Similarly, it will often be possible to use analogical reasoning to stretch 
principles and rules developed in the weapons or combatant context to govern the 
use of autonomous weapon systems, with the selection between the two grounded 
in a reasoned analysis of why one analogy better addresses the issues at stake.19 
But in some situations, neither the weapon nor the combatant analogy will 
provide a sensible or satisfying answer to a legal question, largely because both 
misrepresent what is fundamentally new about autonomous weapon systems. 
They are weapons, but weapons that may take independent actions.20 They are 
independent actors, but actors that may be completely controlled in real time, 
either by their deployers or by hackers, simply by switching them from an 
“autonomous” to a “semi-autonomous” mode.  
There are other entities that participate in armed conflicts—namely, 
children and animals—that are neither conventional weapons nor combatants. 
Like autonomous weapon systems, these nontraditional warfighters are capable of 
autonomous action and, by extension, they may sometimes act in unpredictable 
ways. But when their unexpected actions cause what appears to be a serious 
violation of international humanitarian law, they cannot be held individually 
liable under existing international criminal law, as they do not have the requisite 
mens rea to commit a war crime.21 Given the similarities between autonomous 
weapon systems, child soldiers, and animal combatants, it is tempting to think that 
we can look to those legal regimes for regulatory guidance.  
Unfortunately, the solution is not that simple. The law of armed conflict 
has little to say about either child or animal combatants, rendering these analogies 
unhelpful in regulating autonomous weapon systems. Child soldiers are banned to 
protect children from the horrors of war; the same reasoning hardly applies to 
autonomous weapon systems. Meanwhile, the law of animal combatants is nearly 
nonexistent.  
                                                 
18 Alex Davies, Self-Driving Trucks Are Now Delivering Refrigerators, WIRED (Nov. 13, 2017), 
https://www.wired.com/story/embark-self-driving-truck-deliveries/ [https://perma.cc/T8S9-
XZC4]. 
19 Genevieve Lakier, The Problem Isn’t the Use of Analogies But the Analogies Courts Use, 
KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INST., https://knightcolumbia.org/content/problem-isnt-use-analogies-
analogies-courts-use#/_ftnref14 (last visited May 4, 2018) [https://perma.cc/Q6ET-VTUN] 
(“[A]nalogies will prove useful only to the extent they are used thoughtfully, to illuminate the 
similarities and dissimilarities that matter for the purposes of the law.”). 
20 See, e.g. Alan L. Schuller, At the Crossroads of Control: The Intersection of Artificial 
Intelligence in Autonomous Weapon Systems with International Humanitarian Law, 8 HARV. 
NAT’L SEC. J. 379, 380 (2017) (“Advances in AI will likely produce [autonomous weapon 
systems] that are different in kind from existing weapon systems and thus require a fresh approach 
to evaluating [compliance with international humanitarian law].”). 
21 See infra notes 100–101, 113, 140 and accompanying text. 
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Additionally, all of these potential analogies—weapon, combatant, child 
soldier, animal—are inappropriate and constraining. They either fail to capture a 
legally salient characteristic, or they imply the existence of a trait that is not 
actually there. Furthermore, by limiting our understanding of this new technology, 
these analogies impede our ability to appropriately regulate it.22 Rather than being 
a single, embodied unit, autonomous weapon systems will likely take a variety of 
forms, ranging from disembodied malware to networked systems of sensors and 
robots. These different forms and capabilities will affect how autonomous weapon 
systems can or should be regulated. 
Many autonomous weapon systems in use today are relatively 
uncontroversial because they can be analogized to other weapons and regulated 
accordingly.23 But the strain is already showing. It is not clear, for example, how 
existing law applies to weapon systems with in-field learning capabilities24 or 
autonomous cyberoperations.25 As increasingly autonomous weapon systems are 
developed and deployed, there will be additional situations where no analogy will 
be appropriate. As is often the case when analogical reasoning cannot justifiably 
                                                 
22 Cf. Duncan Hollis, Re-Thinking the Boundaries of Law in Cyberspace: A Duty to Hack?, in 
CYBERWAR: LAW AND ETHICS FOR VIRTUAL CONFLICTS (J. Ohlin et al. eds., 2015) (discussing 
issues with applying territorial boundary-based rules in cyber “space”). 
23 Crootof, supra note 2, at 1873. Of course, all weapon-like autonomous weapon systems must be 
analogized to the appropriate weapon. An autonomous munition, an autonomous weapons 
platform, and an autonomous operational system will have fundamentally different capabilities, 
notwithstanding the fact that all are capable of independently selecting and engaging targets. See 
Michael Horowitz, Why Words Matter: The Real World Consequences of Defining Autonomous 
Weapon Systems, 30 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L.J. 85, 86 (2016) (proposing that new regulations 
distinguish between munition, platform, and operational autonomous weapon systems). Stationary 
and mobile weapon systems, embodied and software weapon systems, and short- and long-range 
weapon systems will have different reaches and ranges for the use of force—and different damage 
potentials should they act unpredictably. See PAUL SCHARRE, AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS AND 
OPERATIONAL RISK 12 (2016) 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_Autonomous-weapons-operational-
risk.pdf?mtime=20160906080515 [https://perma.cc/CJC9-6RX8] (defining “damage potential” as 
“the amount of damage an autonomous system could do, if it failed to perform appropriately, 
before a human operator could take corrective action” and as depending “upon the inherent hazard 
of the system—the type of task being performed and the environment in which it is operating”). 
24 James Farrant & Christopher M. Ford, Autonomous Weapons and Weapon Reviews: The UK 
Second International Weapon Review Forum, 93 INT’L L. STUD. 389, 406–07 (2017). 
25 Experts disagree over whether Stuxnet—malware that destroyed 1,000 Iranian centrifuges used 
to enrich uranium—constitutes an “armed attack” justifying the use of responsive force. TALLINN 
MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS r. 71 cmt. 10 
(Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2017). Stuxnet had “a tremendous amount of autonomy,” but that 
autonomy was bounded by various safety features. PAUL SCHARRE, ARMY OF NONE: 
AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS AND THE FUTURE OF WAR 214–16 (2018); see also KERSTEIN VIGNARD, 
THE WEAPONIZATION OF INCREASINGLY AUTONOMOUS TECHNOLOGIES: AUTONOMOUS WEAPON 
SYSTEMS AND CYBER OPERATIONS 19 (2017) (arguing that those discussing the regulation of 
autonomous weapon systems should consider the relevance of increasingly autonomous cyber 
technologies). 
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stretch extant law to address novel legal questions raised by a new technology, 
new law is needed.  
I. Autonomous Weapon Systems 
Weapon systems can be roughly grouped into four categories of 
autonomy: inert, automated, semi-autonomous, and autonomous. Inert weapons 
are “objects requiring contemporaneous operation by a human being to be lethal,” 
and include everything from stones to advanced handheld firearms.26 Automated 
weapon systems may be deployed long before they engage an unknown and 
unpredicted target, but they act in a predictable manner. A dumb landmine or 
tripwire sentry gun acts independently, but it does not “select” a target; rather, it 
responds predictably to a preset trigger.27 A semi-autonomous weapon system, in 
contrast, has autonomous capabilities in functions relevant to target selection and 
engagement—but it cannot both select and engage targets independently.28 Most 
“fire and forget” missiles and unmanned drones in operation today are semi-
autonomous, as a human operator must take some affirmative action for a target to 
be selected or for a selected target to be engaged. Finally, an autonomous weapon 
system is capable of independently selecting and engaging targets based on 
conclusions derived from gathered information and preprogramed constraints.29  
Over thirty states already have “air, rocket, and missile defense systems 
with human-supervised autonomous modes,”30 and states continue to develop 
increasingly autonomous weapon systems.31 The U.S. Aegis control system, 
operated in conjunction with the U.S. Phalanx Close In Weapons System (CIWS), 
is an autonomous weapon system, insofar as it has an operational mode that 
presumes human operators are incapacitated and allows it to independently 
identify and engage incoming anti-ship missiles and aircraft.32 The Israeli Harpy 
                                                 
26 Crootof, supra note 2, at 1864. 
27 Id. at 1857–63 (discussing what target selection and engagement entails, including the 
distinctions between specific and general targets and the relevance of sufficient time for 
affirmative human action); id. at 1864–65 (discussing automated weapons). 
28 Id. at 1865. 
29 Id. at 1855–56 (noting that such constraints may include general requirements grounded in the 
law of armed conflict to specific parameters of a given mission); SCHARRE, supra note 25, at 50 
(“It is freedom, not intelligence, that defines an autonomous weapon system.”). 
30 SCHARRE, supra note 23, at 47. 
31 Cf. Farrant & Ford, supra note 24, at 395–99 (discussing current, near-term, and long-term 
trends in autonomous weapon systems research and development). 
32 John Pike, MK 15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS), FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS, 
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/syst/weaps/mk-15.htm (last visited May 26, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/6SN8-FFP5]; see also Gary E. Marchant et al., International Governance of 
Autonomous Military Robots, 12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 272, 287 (2011) (describing the 
“casualty” setting, which allows the system to do “what it thinks is necessary to save the ship”). 
Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 9 60 
Loitering Weapon, an airborne weapon that identifies and destroys enemy radar 
emitters, is another example of a fielded autonomous weapon system.33  
Autonomous weapon systems in use today act in largely predictable ways, 
either because they are operated in semi-autonomous modes or in relatively stable 
environments. For example, the South Korean SGR-A1 is a stationary, armed 
robot that allegedly has a fully autonomous setting, but South Korea maintains 
that it is used only in conjunction with a human operator and exclusively to 
monitor the relatively static Korean demilitarized zone.34 
It is impossible, however, to guarantee that autonomous weapon systems 
will always perform as expected. In addition to the more mundane sources of 
unpredictability extant in any weapon system, such as manufacturing defects and 
error rates, autonomous weapon systems are subject to additional kinds of 
malfunction.35 They are necessarily complex systems, and the more complex their 
programming, the more opportunity there is for unforeseen interactions that cause 
unexpected results.36 Elements in a system can interact in unanticipated ways that 
create or compound the harms of any single discrete failure.37 Human-to-system 
interfaces introduce additional opportunities for confusion and catastrophic 
errors,38 and it is nearly impossible to predict how one state’s autonomous 
weapon systems will interact with allies’ and enemies’ systems.39 Nor will it 
                                                 
33 Harpy Loitering Weapon, ISR. AEROSPACE INDUS., http://www.iai.co.il/2013/36694-16153-
en/Business_Areas_Land.aspx (last visited May 4, 2018). 
34 SCHARRE, supra note 25, at 104–05. 
35 In addition to malfunctions described in the text, autonomous weapon systems are also at risk of 
hacking and other malicious action. See, e.g., MILES BRUNDIGE ET AL., THE MALICIOUS USE OF 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: FORECASTING, PREVENTION, AND MITIGATION 17–18 (2018) 
(“Today’s AI systems suffer from a number of novel unresolved vulnerabilities. . . . These 
vulnerabilities are distinct from traditional software vulnerabilities (e.g. bugger overflows) and 
demonstrate that while AI systems can exceed human performance in many ways, they can also 
fail in ways that a human never would.”).  
36 SCHARRE, supra note 23, at 13; see also SCHARRE, supra note 25, at 210 (quoting Bradford 
Tousley as observing that automated stock trading—with its attendant unavoidable “flash 
crashes”—is a “‘great analogy’ for the challenges of automation in military applications”). 
37 Stephanie Carvin, Normal Autonomous Accidents: What Happens When Killer Robots Fail? 1 
(Mar. 1, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3161446 (discussing the relevance of 
“Normal Accident Theory (and its critics) to explore the concerns raised over [lethal autonomous 
weapon systems] through the lens of system failure”); SCHARRE, supra note 23, at 25 (discussing 
“normal accidents” theory). 
38 M.C. Elish, Moral Crumple Zones: Cautionary Tales in Human-Robot Interaction (Mar. 20, 
2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2757236 
(discussing situations where miscommunications between human beings and machine systems 
resulted in preventable accidents). 
39 Carvin, supra note 37, at 16 (“[W]e should very well expect serious challenges when [lethal 
autonomous weapon systems] begin to regularly encounter one another.”); Heather Roff, The 
Strategic Robot Problem: Lethal Autonomous Weapons in War, 13 J. MIL. ETHICS 211, 218 (2014) 
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always be possible to determine when a system is malfunctioning, as “systems are 
not always good at communicating what is going on when something goes 
wrong.”40 Finally, to the extent autonomous weapon systems rely on artificial 
neural networks—digital networks that “learn” from data, including past actions, 
to develop their own conclusions and rules41—the reasons for a given action may 
be as inscrutable as the action was unexpected.42  
In short, autonomous weapon systems have the capacity for independent 
and thus inherently unpredictable action, which both distinguishes them from 
other types of weapons and raises a host of legal questions.43 What kind of legal 
review is sufficient for an entity with in-field learning capabilities?44 What 
constitutes “meaningful human control” over an autonomous weapon system?45 
When and how should someone be held accountable if an autonomous weapon 
system’s actions result in a serious violation of international humanitarian law?46 
__________________________________________________________________ 
(noting that “international or allied joint forces activities are [already] plagued by operational 
difficulties due to the joining of different militaries”).  
40 Carvin, supra note 37, at 9 (discussing how malfunctioning systems can provide misleading 
information and multifaceted systems make it difficult to identify problems). 
41 DAVID KRIESEL, A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO NEURAL NETWORKS 7 (2007), 
http://www.dkriesel.com/_media/science/neuronalenetze-en-zeta2-2col-dkrieselcom.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9PWA-QFJN]. 
42 SCHARRE, supra note 23, at 15; see also Joel Lehman et al., The Surprising Creativity of Digital 
Evolution: A Collection of Anecdotes from the Evolutionary Computation and Artificial Life 
Research Communities (Mar. 29, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1803.03453.pdf [https://perma.cc/7A5H-64HM] (collecting stories of 
evolving algorithms acting unexpectedly). AlphaGo, for example, is an algorithm that mastered 
the board game Go by repeatedly playing itself. Expert Go players have described its strategies as 
brilliant and incomprehensible. See Dawn Chan, The AI That Has Nothing to Learn From 
Humans, ATLANTIC (Oct. 20, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/10/alphago-zero-the-ai-that-taught-itself-
go/543450/?utm_source=atlfb [https://perma.cc/DJE6-WQ85] (quoting experts as saying the 
moves were “how I imagine games from far in the future,” “Go from an alternate dimension,” and 
“alien”). 
43 Of course, autonomous weapon systems also raise a host of moral, strategic, and political 
questions as well. This paper, however, is primarily concerned with how analogies are employed 
to (sometimes inappropriately) stretch the law to cover this new technology. 
44 See Farrant & Ford, supra note 24, at 406–07 (discussing Article 36 legal reviews for 
continuously learning systems). 
45 See, e.g. Michael C. Horowitz & Paul Scharre, Meaningful Human Control in Weapon Systems: 
A Primer 7 (Ctr. for New Am. Sec., Working Paper No. 031315, 2015), 
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/189786/Ethical_Autonomy_Working_Paper_031315.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KY8C-FHX2] (describing two main schools of thought regarding the principle’s 
legal status); see also Rebecca Crootof, A Meaningful Floor for ‘Meaningful Human Control’, 30 
TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L.J. 53, 58–60 (2016) (noting benefits of retaining imprecision in 
international standards governing new technology but arguing for an interpretative floor for the 
concept of “meaningful human control” grounded on existing humanitarian protections). 
46 See, e.g., Rebecca Crootof, War Torts: Accountability for Autonomous Weapons, 164 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1347, 1376–77 (2016) (discussing when individuals can and cannot be held directly 
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In the attempt to answer these questions, scholars and advocates are relying on 
familiar but inadequate—and therefore misleading—analogies.  
II. Common Analogies 
Autonomous weapon systems are commonly analogized to weapons and 
combatants, implicating two distinct legal regimes with different foundational 
assumptions. This Section reviews basic tenants of both legal regimes and 
identifies legal questions relevant to the governance of autonomous weapon 
systems that neither regime can adequately address absent the creation of new, 
supplementary rules.  
A.  Weapons 
1. The law of weapons 
It is widely recognized that “[i]n any armed conflict, the right of the 
Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.”47 
Both customary international law and various treaties circumscribe which 
weapons may be lawfully fielded.48  
Weapons that cause unnecessary injury or suffering are prohibited. This 
tech-neutral prohibition was first articulated by the European powers in the Saint 
Petersburg Declaration of 1868, which forbade the use of weapons “which 
uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death 
inevitable” as “contrary to the laws of humanity.”49 It has since been reiterated in 
numerous treaties and is now recognized as customary international law.50 
The customary prohibition on indiscriminate attacks implies that 
inherently indiscriminate weapons—those that cannot be directed at a military 
objective or whose effects cannot be controlled—are also per se unlawful.51 As is 
__________________________________________________________________ 
criminally liable for the acts of an autonomous weapon system); id. at 1386 (arguing that states 
should be held strictly liable for the harms caused by their autonomous weapon systems). 
47 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 22, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 
2277, 1 Bevans 631; see also First Additional Protocol, supra note 8, art. 35(1). 
48 Customary international law derives from “evidence of a general practice accepted as law.” 
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, T.S. No. 993. While treaty law 
is binding only on states party to the treaty, customary international law binds all states (subject to 
a limited “opt-out” exception).  
49 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Certain Explosive Projectiles, Nov. 29–
Dec. 11, 1868, 18 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 1) 474, 138 Consol. T.S. 297.  
50 Rule 70. Weapons of a Nature to Cause Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary Suffering, INT’L 
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule70 (last visited 
May 4, 2018) [https://perma.cc/KYM8-NVMB].  
51 Rule 71. Weapons That Are by Nature Indiscriminate, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule71 (last visited May 4, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/G8V3-W942]. 
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often the case with tech-neutral rules, what constitutes an inherently 
indiscriminate weapon has evolved with new technological developments. For 
example, “many of the gravity bombs designed for release from high altitudes that 
were dropped during World War II would today be characterized as 
indiscriminate.”52 
While less established, weapons that “are intended, or may be expected, to 
cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment”53 are 
likely also unlawful. This rule was codified in the 1977 First Additional Protocol 
to the Geneva Conventions.54 Since then, the prohibition on the intentional 
destruction of the natural environment has been recognized by many states as 
customary international law,55 which implies that weapons intended to cause such 
destruction are prohibited. 
Finally, there are a number of tech-specific weapons bans and regulations, 
usually enacted through treaties, which have enjoyed varying degrees of 
success.56 The ban on “laser weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat 
function or as one of their combat functions, to cause permanent blindness to 
unenhanced vision”57 may well be the most successful ban of all time, as there is 
little controversy over what it prohibits and there are no recorded violations.58 
Other treaty bans, like the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons, are now 
                                                 
52 Schmitt, supra note 9, at 10 n.29. 
53 Rule 45. Causing Serious Damage to the Natural Environment, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED 
CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule45 (last visited May 4, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/5FG3-KHAJ] [hereinafter ICRC Rule 45]. 
54 First Additional Protocol, supra note 8, art. 35(3). 
55 ICRC Rule 45, supra note 53 (discussing state practice supporting and limiting this claim).  
56 For a list of oft-cited bans of specific weapons in the autonomous weapon systems debate and 
common wisdom regarding their respective successes and failures, see Crootof, supra note 2, 
appendix (discussing various attempted and enacted weapons bans, including crossbows, aerial 
bombardment, submarines, nuclear weapons, cluster munitions, anti-personnel landmines, 
biological weapons, chemical weapons, and permanently blinding lasers).  
57 Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV) art. 1, Oct. 13, 1995, S. Treaty Doc. No. 
105-1, 2024 U.N.T.S. 167. 
58 Crootof, supra note 2, at 1915. Given its success, advocates for a ban on autonomous weapon 
systems often tout the ban on blinding laser weapons to argue that preemptive weapons bans can 
be highly effective. See generally, e.g., PRECEDENT FOR PREEMPTION, supra note 14; MINES 
ACTION CANADA, LESSONS FROM PROTOCOL IV ON BLINDING LASER WEAPONS FOR THE CURRENT 
DISCUSSIONS ABOUT AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS (2014), 
https://bankillerrobotscanada.files.wordpress.com/2014/05/international-piv-memo-final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FA8Z-F5GF]. However, permanently blinding laser weapons share few 
characteristics with autonomous weapon systems, rendering the comparison inapt. See Rebecca 
Crootof, Why the Ban on Permanently Blinding Lasers is Poor Precedent for a Prohibition on 
Autonomous Weapon Systems, LAWFARE (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-
prohibition-permanently-blinding-lasers-poor-precedent-ban-autonomous-weapon-systems 
[https://perma.cc/YLU2-GNYH]. 
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recognized as customary international law.59 However, other attempts to prohibit 
the use of certain weapons were less successful: the ban on the use of crossbows 
failed immediately and dramatically,60 while the ban on aerial bombardment did 
not outlast the invention of the airplane.61  
To ensure that fielded weapons may be lawfully used, states are charged 
with conducting legal reviews of new weapon designs.62 Of course, any lawful 
weapon may be used in an unlawful manner, which is why international 
humanitarian law also regulates the behavior of individuals in armed conflict. 
2. The limits of the weapons analogy 
Analogizing autonomous weapon systems to conventional weapons 
simplifies some legal analyses, but that simplicity can prove misleading. 
Certainly, an autonomous weapon system is not inherently unlawful if it (1) will 
not cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, (2) is capable of being used 
in a discriminate manner, (3) is not intended to or is not expected to cause 
widespread and severe environmental damage, and (4) does not employ weapons 
that are specifically prohibited (like poison or permanently blinding lasers). 
Autonomous weapon systems currently in use have cleared this low bar—in part 
because, as noted earlier, they are being used in predictable environments or in 
semi-autonomous modes. 
However, the weapon analogy complicates other legal analyses. First, this 
analogy raises the tricky question of what constitutes a sufficient legal review for 
increasingly autonomous weapon systems.63 Given that its actions will be 
determined in part by stimuli from its environment, an autonomous weapon 
system will need to be tested in a variety of different virtual and real scenarios 
and only cleared for use in sufficiently similar real world circumstances.64 For 
                                                 
59 See, e.g., Rule 74. Chemical Weapons, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter24_rule74 (last visited May 4, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/7J45-URPC].  
60 W.T. Mallison, Jr., The Laws of War and the Juridical Control of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
in General and Limited Wars, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308, 316 (1967). 
61 Arthur K. Kuhn, The Beginnings of an Aërial Law, 4 AM. J. INT’L L. 109, 119–20 (1910) 
(suggesting that states’ failure to renew the ban was likely linked to their interest in exploring the 
military applications of airplanes).  
62 This obligation, codified in the First Additional Protocol, supra note 8, art. 36, is also binding 
on all states under customary international law, see Kathleen Lewand et al., A Guide to the Legal 
Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare: Measures to Implement Article 36 of 
Additional Protocol I of 1977, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 931, 933 (2006) (noting that the 
customary and treaty prohibitions on certain kinds of weapons imply that states are obliged to 
conduct some form of review to avoid fielding unlawful weapons). 
63 Cf. Farrant & Ford, supra note 24, at 395–99. 
64 Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEF. SCI. BD., SUMMER STUDY ON AUTONOMY 29 (2016) 
(recommending “a combination of modeling and simulation to explore thousands of text cases, 
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some systems—say, ones designed only to be used in outer space, where there is 
limited variation—that will be relatively easy. For others, like mobile land 
systems that might be deployed in dramatically different environments, it will be 
difficult to ensure that a system’s training is adequate. Accordingly, there is a risk 
that, absent international rules specifically governing autonomous weapon 
systems, states’ idiosyncratic interpretations of tech-neutral principles will result 
in the fielding of unlawful weapons.65 
Second, there is no precedent for evaluating weapon systems with the 
capacity for in-field learning.66 Traditionally, legal reviews presume that any 
significant change in software or hardware will be identified and evaluated before 
the altered weapon is fielded. But weapon systems with certain kinds of artificial 
intelligence might be able to evolve in response to environmental stimuli, such 
that a fielded autonomous weapon system will eventually be significantly 
different from the system originally approved. This problem might be addressed 
in various ways: by short-term deployments, by regularly scheduled evaluations 
and reboots, or by completely prohibiting in-field learning (at least with regard to 
target selection and engagement tasks). All of these solutions, however, would 
likely require new domestic guidelines, if not international standards. 
Granted, the legal review requirement already suffers from significant 
noncompliance. Most states do not publicly acknowledge that they conduct legal 
reviews of new weaponry,67 and legal reviews have been critiqued for being 
perfunctory or for being easily evaded by presenting a new weapon as merely a 
minor modification of an approved precursor.68 A silver lining is that the 
international conversation about how best to regulate autonomous weapon 
systems has the potential to highlight these issues and contribute to the 
development of widely-accepted standards for conducting legal reviews. Already, 
__________________________________________________________________ 
statistically measuring system performance against the desired standard, then doing real world 
testing of the system to ensure that the modeled and real-world behavior match for corner cases 
that span the range of system performance”). 
65 ARTICLE 36, ARTICLE 36 REVIEWS AND ADDRESSING LETHAL AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS 
SYSTEMS 2–3 (2016) (briefing paper for delegates at the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems). 
66 Farrant & Ford, supra note 24, at 406–07; see also Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of 
Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 538–45 (2015) (discussing robotic “emergence,” the ability of 
robotic systems to adapt to circumstances and “learn” from mistakes). 
67 Farrant & Ford, supra note 24, at 401. 
68 For example, modifications to the US B61 nuclear bomb have sparked debate over whether it 
constitutes a new weapon. Julian Borger, America’s New, More ‘Usable’, Nuclear Bomb in 
Europe, GUARDIAN (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/julian-borger-global-
security-blog/2015/nov/10/americas-new-more-usable-nuclear-bomb-in-europe 
[https://perma.cc/KTX4-659S]. 
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a few states have been more transparent about their internal review procedures in 
discussions of regulating autonomous weapon systems.69 
Third, after an attack, it is unlikely that anyone will be held criminally 
liable or that victims will be compensated for the unpredictable but injurious 
actions of autonomous weapon systems. International criminal law requires that a 
person act “willfully”—which is usually understood as acting intentionally or 
recklessly—for criminal liability to attach.70 Of course, someone who 
intentionally or recklessly uses an autonomous weapon systems to commit serious 
violations of international humanitarian law will be criminally liable,71 and states 
may voluntarily compensate the injured.72 But if an individual fields an 
autonomous weapon system that unexpectedly destroys a hospital, downs a 
passenger jet, or otherwise takes action that would appear to be a war crime, the 
individual deployer will not be criminally liable.73 The destructive consequences 
of the malfunction will be considered an accident, a tragic but not unexpected side 
effect of war, and the harm will lie where it falls.74  
Fourth, and more generally, autonomous weapon systems allow for greater 
temporal and geographic distance between a human deployer’s decision to use 
lethal force and the consequence of that decision. Thus, analogizing autonomous 
                                                 
69 ARTICLE 36, supra note 65, at 1, 5 n.2 (noting that Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, Russia, 
the United States, and the United Kingdom have provided outlines of their weapons review 
procedures in the context of discussing autonomous weapon systems). 
70 See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 30(1), July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 (“[A] person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment . . . only if the 
material elements are committed with intent and knowledge.”); id. art. 30(3) (defining 
“knowledge” as entailing “awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the 
ordinary course of events”); see also Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 152 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000) (“[T]he mens rea constituting all the 
[grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions] includes both guilty intent and recklessness which 
may be likened to serious criminal negligence.”). 
71 Crootof, supra note 46, at 1376–77 (describing these as the “easy cases” for evaluating 
accountability). 
72 See generally John Fabian Witt, Form and Substance in the Law of Counterinsurgency 
Damages, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1455 (2008) (discussing the role of voluntary condolence 
payments in U.S. military strategy). 
73 Crootof, supra note 46, at 1377 (“If an autonomous weapon system is merely another weapon in 
a state’s arsenal, its deployer will be liable only if she intended or foresaw the reasonable 
likelihood of civilian harm and nonetheless used the weapon system.”). 
74 Some have argued that this lack of accountability may have the perverse effect of encouraging 
commanders to inappropriately deploy autonomous weapon systems. HUM. RTS. WATCH & INT’L 
HUM. RTS. CLINIC AT HARV. L. SCH., MIND THE GAP: THE LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR KILLER 
ROBOTS 24 (2015) [hereinafter MIND THE GAP]; Peter Asaro, On Banning Autonomous Weapon 
Systems: Human Rights, Automation, and the Dehumanization of Lethal Decision-Making, 94 
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 687, 701 (2012); Heather M. Roff, Killing in War: Responsibility, 
Liability, and Lethal Autonomous Robots, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ETHICS AND WAR 352, 
357–58 (Fritz Allhof, Nicholas G. Evans & Adam Henschke eds., 2013). 
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weapon systems to other weapons raises the question of what constitutes an 
appropriate level of human oversight or involvement in attacks generally.75 To be 
sure, other existing technologies—like anti-personnel landmines, fire-and-forget 
missiles, and the drones used for targeted killings—already test the presumption 
that there is a direct link between a weapon’s deployer and its target, and these 
technologies are often critiqued (among other things) for permitting unacceptable 
detachment from the act of killing.76 But autonomous weapon systems permit 
even greater degrees of temporal and geographic distance, making this latent issue 
even more salient.77 
While the existing law of weaponry will govern most uses of 
contemporary autonomous weapon systems, this new technology’s capacity for 
independent action raises issues that simply are not currently addressed by this 
legal regime. The weapons review process does not have widely accepted 
procedures for evaluating the lawfulness of independent or learning weapon 
systems, international criminal law does not hold individuals accountable for the 
unpredictable actions of autonomous weapon systems, and it is unclear whether 
there is customary international law requiring a certain level of human oversight 
or involvement in attacks. Given their ability to act as independent and 
unpredictable agents, it is tempting to analogize autonomous weapon systems to 
another autonomous warfighter—human combatants.  
                                                 
75 ROFF & MOYES, supra note 12, at 6. 
76 See, e.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, Banning Autonomous Killing: The Legal and Ethical 
Requirement that Humans Make Near-Time Lethal Decisions, in THE AMERICAN WAY OF 
BOMBING: CHANGING ETHICAL AND LEGAL NORMS, FROM FLYING FORTRESSES TO DRONES 224, 
234 (Matthew Evangelista & Henry Shue eds., 2014) (arguing that a new norm of international 
law, requiring a close temporal space between force deployment and target engagement, is 
necessary to “keep a human conscience” in the decision to use lethal force). Of course, one of the 
primary aims of weapons development is to reduce risks to one’s forces by increasing geographic 
and temporal distances between them and dangerous targets. Jens David Ohlin, Remoteness and 
Reciprocal Risk, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON REMOTE WARFARE (Jens David Ohlin ed., 2017); 
Oren Gross, The New Way of War: Is There a Duty to Use Drones?, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1, 33 (2015). 
This tension—between the bent towards weapons that allow for distance and weapons that are not 
insufficiently precise—is a central one in international humanitarian law. Michael N. Schmitt, 
Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate 
Balance, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 795 (2010). 
77 The resulting conversation over what constitutes “meaningful human control” in an attack is still 
in its infancy. Crootof, supra note 45, at 54 (observing that the broad support for the principle 
“comes at a familiar legislative cost: there is no consensus as to what ‘meaningful human control’ 
actually requires”). However, some argue that a formal norm is coalescing or already exists. Peter 
Asaro, Jus Nascendi, Robotic Weapons and the Martens Clause, in ROBOT LAW, supra note 5, 
367, 368 (“[T]here is already an emerging norm concerning meaningful human control over the 
targeting of weapons and the use of violent force . . . .”). 
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B.  Combatants 
1. The law of combatants 
Generally, members of the armed forces, associated militias, and 
associated volunteer corps are considered combatants;78 under certain (and 
debated) conditions, members of organized armed groups and civilians directly 
participating in hostilities may also be considered combatants.79 In recognition of 
the inherent autonomy of combatants—the ability to observe, reflect, and choose 
a course of action80—international humanitarian law attempts to regulate their 
behavior by, first, using training to help individuals internalize international 
humanitarian law and, second, through the deterrent power of punishment. 
There are myriad treaties and customary international laws governing 
combatants’ actions in armed conflicts,81 but the law of targeting—which might 
be characterized as the law of when, how, and against whom weapons may be 
employed in attacks—is of particular relevance to this discussion. The law of 
targeting is grounded on the principles of military necessity and humanity, which 
manifest in the application of the distinction, proportionality, and feasible 
precautions requirements.82 The distinction requirement obliges parties to a 
conflict to distinguish between lawful and unlawful targets.83 The proportionality 
requirement prohibits any attack that “may be expected to cause incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated.”84 Lastly, the feasible precautions requirement mandates 
that a commander shall (1) “do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to 
                                                 
78 See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4(A), Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; First Additional 
Protocol, supra note 8, arts. 43–44. 
79 See generally INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF 
DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2009). For 
the purposes of this paper, I do not distinguish between privileged or unprivileged combatants. 
80 “Autonomy,” as a philosophical concept, is far from well defined. See, e.g., John Christman, 
Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2015), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral (discussing 
conceptual variations and controversies). 
81 Including prohibitions on deception, rules regarding communication with adversarial forces, and 
requirements concerning the treatment of detainees. 
82 Schmitt, supra note 76, at 803–05. 
83 First Additional Protocol, supra note 8, art. 48. 
84 Id., art. 51(5)(b). Such determinations are evaluated under a “reasonable commander” standard. 
See Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, ¶ 58 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003) (“In determining whether an attack was proportionate it is necessary to 
examine whether a reasonably well-informed person in the circumstances of the actual perpetrator, 
making reasonable use of the information available to him or her, could have expected excessive 
civilian casualties to result from the attack.”). 
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be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special 
protection but are military objectives”; (2) “take all feasible precautions in the 
choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event 
to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to 
civilian objects”; and (3) select the objective that “may be expected to cause the 
least danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects” when choosing among 
objectives with similar military advantages.85 As with the seemingly tech-neutral 
rules of weapon design, new technological developments have sometimes raised 
confusion in how these rules should be interpreted and applied.86  
To ensure that combatants internalize these and other foundational norms 
of international humanitarian law, the 1949 Geneva Conventions require state 
parties to train members of their armed forces in the law and to disseminate the 
Conventions “as widely as possible.”87 The International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) has identified these requirements as customary international law.88 
                                                 
85 First Additional Protocol, supra note 8, art. 57; see also DOD MANUAL, supra note 10, § 6.5.9.3 
(noting that, in the context of autonomous weapon systems, feasible precautions might “include 
monitoring the operation of the weapon system or programming or building mechanisms for the 
weapon to deactivate automatically after a certain period of time”). 
86 Cf. Crootof, supra note 46, at 1370–71 (“As weapon systems become more accurate and require 
less lethal force for effectiveness, what is considered a ‘proportionate’ level of collateral damage 
has narrowed dramatically.”); Jens David Ohlin, Is Jus in Bello in Crisis?, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 
27, 28 (2013) (“If the use of drone technology against non-state actors (NSAs) has made anything 
clear, it is this: there is far less agreement regarding the application of core principles of 
international humanitarian law . . . and international criminal law . . . than previously thought . . . 
.”). 
87 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field art. 47, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Geneva 
Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 48, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 
85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 78, art. 127; 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 144, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]. The obligation 
to disseminate is reiterated in the two 1977 Additional Protocols. First Additional Protocol, supra 
note 8, art. 83; Protocol Additional (II) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 19, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 609. 
88 Rule 142. Instruction in International Humanitarian Law within Armed Forces, INT’L COMM. OF 
THE RED CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule142 (last visited May 4, 
2018) [https://perma.cc/E4KF-WL65] (“States and parties to the conflict must provide instruction in 
international humanitarian law to their armed forces.”); Rule 143. Dissemination of International 
Humanitarian Law Among the Civilian Population, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule143 (last visited May 4, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/JR9S-XX3A]. 
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However, in recognition that training will not completely prevent 
autonomous combatants from committing serious violations,89 international 
humanitarian law also relies on the deterrent power of punishment. State parties to 
the Geneva Conventions are required to search for and try individuals that have 
allegedly committed grave breaches of the Conventions,90 and the ICRC has 
identified the duty to prosecute and punish war crimes as customary international 
law.91 Nor are only those individuals who commit grave breaches potentially 
liable; it is generally understood that a superior may be liable under the customary 
doctrine of “command responsibility” if “she exercises effective control over a 
subordinate, knows of or has reason to know of the subordinate’s actual or 
intended criminal acts, and fails to take necessary and reasonable measures to 
prevent or punish them.”92 The “prevent or punish” requirement emphasizes the 
import of minimizing violations while implicitly acknowledging the impossibility 
of always being able to prevent autonomous agents from acting unlawfully. 
2. The limits of the combatant analogy 
Employing the combatant analogy sidesteps the problem of what 
constitutes adequate legal review, but it raises other issues regarding appropriate 
training and the utility of threatened punishment. 
How are autonomous weapon systems to be adequately “trained” in the 
principles governing targeting and other law of armed conflict rules?93 Trainings 
developed for human beings assume that the individual has common sense, the 
flexibility to apply general rules to new situations, and a basic morality that 
                                                 
89 See, e.g., David Lloyd Roberts, Training the Armed Forces to Respect International 
Humanitarian Law: The Perspective of the ICRC Delegate to the Armed and Security Forces of 
South Asia, 319 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 433, 434 (1997) (citing Yugoslavia as an “example of a 
failure to implement the law [of armed conflict]—despite apparent good training”). 
90 First Geneva Convention, supra note 87, art. 49; Second Geneva Convention, supra note 87, art. 
50; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 78, art. 129; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 87, 
art. 146.  
91 Rule 158. Prosecution of War Crimes, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule158 (last visited May 4, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/23B3-6YFA] (citing military manuals, national legislation, and official 
statements). 
92 Crootof, supra note 46, at 1378 n.172 (citing Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 
6(3), Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145; Rome Statute, supra note 70, art. 28; Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 6(3), Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1598; Updated 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 7(3), May 25, 1993, 
32 I.L.M. 1192; First Additional Protocol, supra note 8, arts. 86–87; Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case 
No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 346 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998); 
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 182–87 (3d ed. 2013)). 
93 Cf. Kenneth Anderson, Daniel Reisner & Matthew Waxman, Adapting the Law of Armed 
Conflict to Autonomous Weapon Systems, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 386, 410 (2014) (“Whether the actor 
on the battlefield is a ‘who’ or a ‘what’ is not truly the issue, but rather how well that actor 
performs according to the law of armed conflict.”). 
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accompanies growing up as a member of a society. Autonomous weapon systems, 
however, are only as sensible, flexible, and moral as their training data and 
code—but data sets are notoriously biased,94 algorithms are famously inflexible,95 
and there are myriad examples of artificial intelligence systems acting in 
surprising ways when programmers incorrectly presumed they would abide by 
implied, common sense restraints.96 
Ronald Arkin has suggested that it may be possible to deploy autonomous 
weapon systems with “Ethical Adaptors,” a metaprogram that would block a 
“fire” option unless the law of armed conflict and rules of engagement are 
satisfied.97 This top-down approach presumes that a decision tree can be written 
in advance to address any contingency. Others, concerned that such programming 
would prove insufficient in the battlefield environment, have proposed 
supplementary bottom-up approaches, whereby autonomous systems are designed 
as flexible moral learners.98 Both of these proposals assume that technological 
developments will eventually result in autonomous weapon systems being able to 
distinguish between a combatant and civilian, between active and wounded or 
surrendering combatants, and between lawful military objectives and protected 
civilian objects at least as well as human soldiers. In the meantime, guidelines on 
appropriate training are needed. 
Switching from the weapon to the combatant analogy does not solve the 
accountability gap. Again, assuming that no one acts intentionally or recklessly, 
under extant law no one can be held criminally liable if an autonomous weapon 
commits a serious violation of international humanitarian law.99 As of yet, 
                                                 
94 See generally, e.g., Kate Crawford, The Hidden Biases in Big Data, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 1, 
2013), https://hbr.org/2013/04/the-hidden-biases-in-big-data [https://perma.cc/5G7G-MLNC]; 
Batya Friedman & Helen Nissenbaum, Bias in Computer Systems, 14 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON 
INFO. SYS. 330 (1996) (discussing preexisting, technical, and emergent bias in computer systems). 
95 SCHARRE, supra note 23, at 6 (“[T]heir brittle nature means that if pushed beyond the bounds of 
their programming, they may fail, and fail badly.”). 
96 See, e.g., Victoria Krakovna, Specification Gaming Examples in AI, DEEP SAFETY (Apr. 2, 
2018), https://vkrakovna.wordpress.com/2018/04/02/specification-gaming-examples-in-ai/ 
[https://perma.cc/3U33-W8HN] (follow “master list” hyperlink to a collection of examples of 
unintended behaviors in AI systems); see also Dario Amodei & Jack Clark, Faulty Reward 
Functions in the Wild, OPENAI BLOG (Dec. 21, 2016), https://blog.openai.com/faulty-reward-
functions/ [https://perma.cc/95GW-K6QJ] (detailing one example of unexpected AI behavior and 
discussing how it highlights “a more general issue with reinforcement learning: it is often difficult 
or infeasible to capture exactly what we want an agent to do, and as a result we frequently end up 
using imperfect but easily measured proxies. Often this works well, but sometimes it leads to 
undesired or even dangerous actions.”). 
97 RONALD C. ARKIN, GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOR IN AUTONOMOUS ROBOTS 138–43 (2009). 
98 Don Howard & Ioan Muntean, A Minimalist Model of the Artificial Autonomous Moral Agent 
(AAMA), in 2016 AAAI SPRING SYMPOSIUM SERIES 217, 217–23 (AAAI Publ’ns. ed., 2016), 
https://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/SSS/SSS16/paper/view/12760/11954. 
99 See supra note 70 (citing sources). 
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artificial intelligence has not advanced to a point where an autonomous weapon 
system could be said to have acted intentionally or recklessly.100 Nor could it be 
punished, rendering irrelevant the deterrent aim of individual criminal liability.101 
Finally, if an autonomous weapon system is analogized to a human combatant 
gone rogue, “the deployer could be held directly liable only for actions that 
resulted in serious violations if she ordered or otherwise directly contributed to 
the execution of that unlawful action”102—which will not be the case when an 
autonomous weapon system’s act was unforeseen. 
Some have argued that command responsibility could be modified to 
create liability for the actions of autonomous weapon systems, such that a person 
in putative control could always be held liable.103 Doing so, however, would 
necessitate introducing a criminal negligence standard into international criminal 
law, which is at odds with the nulla poena sine culpa principle, which proscribes 
that there be no punishment without guilt.104 As discussed above, the doctrine of 
command responsibility recognizes the impossibility of completely controlling an 
autonomous agent’s actions by requiring commanders to punish crimes that they 
could not prevent. It would be unjust to hold commanders criminally liable for the 
unpredictable actions of an autonomous weapon system that they can neither 
predict nor punish.105 
                                                 
100 Crootof, supra note 46, at 1377 (“If a violation of international humanitarian law is not a war 
crime absent some willful action, autonomous weapon systems are currently incapable of 
committing war crimes.”). 
101 But see generally GABRIEL HALLEVY, WHEN ROBOTS KILL: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE UNDER 
CRIMINAL LAW (2013) (arguing that robots can be held criminally liable and punished, much like 
human beings and corporations); Christina Mulligan, Revenge Against Robots, 69 S.C. L. REV. 
579 (2018) (arguing that vengeful actions against robotic systems may provide beneficial 
psychological satisfaction). 
102 Crootof, supra note 46, at 1377. 
103 See, e.g., Christof Heyns (Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary 
Executions), Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions 
(Lethal Autonomous Robotics and the Protection of Life), ¶ 81, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/47 (Apr. 9, 
2013) [hereinafter Heyns Report] (“[A]mendments to the rules regarding command responsibility 
may be needed to cover the use of [autonomous weapon systems].”); Jens David Ohlin, The 
Combatant’s Stance: Autonomous Weapons on the Battlefield, 92 INT’L L. STUD. 1, 26–29 (2016) 
(arguing for a graduated scheme of criminal liability for commanders who deploy autonomous 
weapon systems that go on to commit war crimes). Geoffrey Corn has also proposed 
implementing “procurement responsibility,” under which the military or civilian official who 
procures a weapon will be responsible for its actions. Geoffrey S. Corn, Autonomous Weapon 




104 Crootof, supra note 46, at 1381–85 (discussing problems with criminalizing negligence). 
105 Instead, I argue that states should be held strictly liable for the actions of their autonomous 
weapon systems. See id. at 1394. 
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Ultimately, the combatant analogy is largely unsatisfying. It highlights the 
importance of training independent warfighters in law of armed conflict 
principles, but provides little guidance on how to train autonomous weapon 
systems. Nor does it solve the accountability gap problem, as no one will likely be 
held criminally liable for a latent malfunction that causes harm. 
***** 
A legal regime for autonomous weapon systems will need to include 
provisions for legal review, training, and accountability. But the law of weapons 
does not currently include standards for evaluating systems with the capacity for 
independent action and in-field learning, the law of combatants does not provide 
guidance on how to adequately train computer programs, and neither legal regime 
addresses the accountability gap. Accordingly, neither the weapon nor combatant 
analogy, standing alone, is sufficient to address the novel legal challenges posed 
by this new kind of warfighter. But what of other entities that participate in armed 
conflict? 
III. Uncommon Analogies 
Autonomous weapon systems, child soldiers, and animal combatants share 
two legally salient characteristics. They are capable of independent action and, by 
extension, may sometimes act in unpredictable ways; however, if they take action 
that resembles a war crime, they cannot be held liable under existing international 
criminal law. Accordingly, this Section considers child soldiers and animal 
combatants as potential models for the regulation of autonomous weapon systems.  
A.  Child Soldiers 
1. The law of child soldiers 
While recruiting or employing child soldiers is a war crime,106 children 
continue to play many roles in armed conflicts, including front-line infantry, 
                                                 
106 The prohibition on the use of child soldiers is articulated in multiple treaties. See Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict, May 25, 2000, T.I.A.S. No. 13094, 2173 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter Optional Protocol on 
Children] (setting eighteen as the minimum age for direct participation in hostilities and for 
compulsory recruitment into state armed forces); Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 38, 
Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (setting fifteen as the minimum age for recruitment or 
participation in armed conflict); Rome Statute, supra note 70, art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi) (including in its 
definition of war crimes “conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years” in 
national armed forces, armed force groups, or using them to participate actively in hostilities); 
Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst 
Forms of Child Labor art. 3(a), June 17, 1999, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106-5, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161 
(including the forced recruitment of individuals under the age of eighteen years for use in armed 
conflict); First Additional Protocol, supra note 8, art. 77(2); Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
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human mine detectors, suicide bombers, human shields, and sex slaves.107 Some 
have been forcibly recruited, but children influenced by various social, economic, 
and environmental factors also voluntarily enlist.108 New weapons developments 
are often celebrated for making war more discriminate and therefore more 
humane,109 but ultra-light and precise small arms have also contributed to the 
usefulness of—and consequently the rise in—child soldiers.110  
Given that their participation in armed conflict is itself unlawful, what 
happens when a child soldier commits a serious violation of international 
humanitarian law?111 As a substantive matter, it is not clear that children have the 
requisite mens rea to commit a war crime. Again, under international law and 
most domestic law, war crimes must be committed “willfully.”112 But, arguably, 
before a certain level of development, children are unable to fully understand their 
acts or the likely consequences, rendering them incapable of acting willfully.113 
As a procedural matter, there is no formal minimum age for international 
criminal liability. The Geneva Conventions require all member states to punish 
grave breaches of the Conventions,114 but they do not specify the age of criminal 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts art. 4(3)(c), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. The prohibition on the recruitment 
or employment of child soldiers is also likely binding on all states under customary international 
law. Rule 136. Recruitment of Child Soldiers, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter39_rule136 (last visited May 4, 
2018) [https://perma.cc/Z7G7-PAG7]; Rule 137. Participation of Child Soldiers in Hostilities, 
INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter39_rule137 (last visited May 4, 2018) [https://perma.cc/UN43-A2JS]. 
107 See, e.g., Priyanka Boghani, Why Afghanistan’s Children Are Being Used As Spies and Suicide 
Bombers, FRONTLINE (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/why-
afghanistans-children-are-used-as-spies-and-suicide-bombers/ [https://perma.cc/MSM9-XZ6B]. 
108 Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, 
Children and Justice During and in the Aftermath of Armed Conflict 27 (Working Paper No. 3, 
2011) [hereinafter Children in Armed Conflict], 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_1957.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K93Z-UDNH]; see also id. at 28 (noting the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict’s argument that the distinction between 
voluntary enlistment and forced recruitment of child soldiers is without meaning, given the often 
desperate circumstances and environment). 
109 See, e.g., Gross, supra note 76, at 48 (discussing how more accurate weaponry allowed for the 
use of smaller, less-lethal munitions, which in turn reduced the likelihood of collateral damage). 
110 See, e.g., Nancy Morisseau, Seen but Not Heard: Child Soldiers Suing Gun Manufacturers 
Under Alien Tort Claims Act, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1263, 1284–85 (2004). 
111 For example, Islamic State militants published a video showing child soldiers executing 
twenty-five men. Lin Jenkins, ISIS Video Shows Killing of Syrian Troops at Palmyra 
Amphitheatre, GUARDIAN (Jul. 4, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/04/isis-
video-killing-palmyra-amphitheatre [https://perma.cc/3BM6-WNCC].  
112 See supra note 70 (citing sources). 
113 See generally, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. CRIM. L & 
CRIMINOLOGY 15 (1997).  
114 See, e.g., First Geneva Convention, supra note 87, art. 49. 
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responsibility. There is an argument that fifteen is the minimum age for individual 
criminal responsibility for war crimes, given that the First Additional Protocol 
sets fifteen as the minimum age for recruitment and participation.115 If a child is 
too young to fight, the reasoning goes, the child is too young to be held criminally 
responsible.116 The International Criminal Court only has jurisdiction to prosecute 
individuals over the age of eighteen at the time of the alleged crime—not because 
younger individuals are necessarily exempt from prosecution, but rather because 
that determination is left to states.117 States, meanwhile, have widely disparate 
minimum ages for domestic criminal liability, ranging from seven to sixteen.118 
So, while an individual under eighteen years of age is unlikely to be tried in an 
international tribunal for a serious violation of the law of armed conflict, those as 
young as seven might be prosecuted and convicted in national courts.119 A child 
soldier’s commander, however, may be tried anywhere for the war crime of using 
child soldiers.120 
2. The limits of the child solider analogy 
While autonomous weapon systems and child soldiers share the potential 
for independent action and the inability to act with the requisite mens rea to be 
held individually liable for committing a war crime, child soldiers are not the best 
analogy for regulatory purposes. The prohibition of child soldiers is grounded 
primarily on the special rights of children121 and the resultant obligation to protect 
them from the physical and psychological dangers associated with armed conflict 
and the horrors of forced labor and sexual exploitation.122 At least at the present 
stage of technological development, these justifications do not map well onto 
                                                 
115 Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 108, at 34. 
116 Id. 
117 Rome Statute, supra note 70, art. 26. Radhika Coomaraswarmy, then-Special Representative 
for Children and Armed Conflict, has noted that there are problematic incentives for setting the 
minimum age for criminal liability too high: “If minor children who have committed serious war 
crimes are not prosecuted, this could be an incentive for their commanders to delegate to them the 
dirtiest orders, aiming at impunity.” Radhika Coomaraswamy, The Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict—
Towards Universal Ratification, 18 INT’L J. CHILDREN’S RTS. 535, 544 (2010). 
118 Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 108, at 35. 
119 Conviction need not imply capital punishment or even imprisonment. Cf. Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, supra note 106, art. 37(a). Instead, “the purpose of any sanction imposed on a 
child should be to promote rehabilitation and reintegration in to the community and not to punish.” 
See Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 108, at 36. Indeed, holding former child soldiers 
accountable in a way that fosters reintegration may be necessary to their personal recovery. 
120 See Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Judgment (Mar. 14, 2012) (finding 
defendant guilty of recruiting and using child soldiers); Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-
01-T, Judgment (Spec. Ct. for Sierra Leone May 18, 2012) (finding defendant guilty of supporting 
the recruitment and use of child soldiers). 
121 See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 106. 
122 See, e.g., Optional Protocol on Children, supra note 106, pmbl. 
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autonomous weapon systems: there is no similar need to protect them from the 
horrors of war.123  
It is worth noting that, because the use of child soldiers is itself unlawful, 
incurring both individual criminal liability and state responsibility,124 there is no 
accountability gap. Commanders employing child soldiers are liable for the war 
crime of using child soldiers—by extension, they should also be liable for any 
unlawful actions of child soldiers they recruit or supervise.125 But there is no 
corresponding ban on the use of autonomous weapon systems, nor is there likely 
to be.126  
Given the fundamental differences between the reasons for regulating the 
use of child soldiers and autonomous weapon systems, this analogy is ultimately 
unhelpful. 
B.  Animal Combatants 
1. The law of animal combatants 
Animals have long participated in armed conflicts: “The variety of animal 
species deployed as ‘soldiers’ in armed conflicts ranges from horses, elephants, 
dogs, bats, camels, seals and pigeons to dolphins, bees, donkeys, belugas, oxen 
and cormorants.”127 Animals have served with distinction—military medals and 
                                                 
123 But see Kate Darling, Extending Legal Protection to Social Robots: The Effects of 
Anthropomorphism, Empathy, and Violent Behavior Towards Robotic Objects, in ROBOT LAW, 
supra note 5, 213, 213–32 (arguing that, as was the underlying purpose of animal abuse laws, we 
should grant social robots legal protections from “harm” precisely because we anthropomorphize 
them); Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward Legal Rights for Natural 
Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 453–55 (1972) (observing that, “each time there is a movement 
to confer rights onto some new ‘entity,’ the proposal is bound to sound odd or frightening or 
laughable” and that many entities once considered “things” under law—including African 
Americans, fetuses, and women—are now independent rights-holders). 
124 See sources cited supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
125 Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 108, at 37. The Chief Prosecutor of the Special Court 
of Sierra Leone has stated that he would not indict persons for crimes committed when they were 
children, but instead would indict their adult recruiters and commanders. Press Release, Special 
Ct. for Sierra Leone Pub. Aff. Off., Special Court Prosecutor Says He Will Not Prosecute Children 
(Nov. 2, 2002), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Press/OTP/prosecutor-110202.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AS9P-CMEG]. 
126 Autonomous weapon systems share few qualities with weapons that have been successfully 
banned, and states are unlikely to voluntarily relinquish their right to use this uniquely effective, 
incompletely understood, and multifaceted tool. Crootof, supra note 2, at 1891–93; Sean Watts, 
Autonomous Weapons: Regulation Tolerant or Regulation Resistant?, 30 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. 
L.J. 177, 178 (2016). 
127 Karsten Nowrot, Animals at War: The Status of ‘Animal Soldiers’ Under International 
Humanitarian Law, 40 HIST. SOC. RES. 128, 130 (2015) (citation omitted). 
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decorations have been awarded to horses, dogs, pigeons, and cats128—and they 
have been formally detained. In February 2014, the Afghanistan Taliban revealed 
that they had captured a British military working dog, and a Taliban spokesman 
offered assurances that the dog “was not injured and is not being mistreated.”129 
Dogs in particular have played many roles in armed conflict, from sentries to 
transporters to bomb detectors.130 In World War II, Russian dogs were trained to 
carry explosives under German tanks in suicide missions.131 Today, states have 
various animal combatant divisions.132 
However, animal combatants have no formal status or protections under 
international humanitarian law.133 The Geneva Conventions presume that only 
human beings can be members of an armed force, militia, or volunteer corps;134 
indeed, the single international humanitarian law treaty reference to animals in 
armed conflict is in Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons, which bans the use of booby-traps or other devices that are attached to 
or associated with “animals or their carcasses.”135  
What, then, would happen if an animal combatant were to take an action 
that resulted in what seemed to be a serious violation of international 
humanitarian law? Imagine if a war dog accidentally carried an explosive under a 
                                                 
128 Id. at 132. 
129 Amir Shah, Taliban: Dog Now a POW in Afghanistan, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 8, 
2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Latest-News-Wires/2014/0208/Taliban-Dog-now-a-
POW-in-Afghanistan. 
130 Types of War Dogs, U.S. WAR DOG ASS’N, http://www.uswardogs.org/war-dog-history/types-
war-dogs/ (last visited May 4, 2018) [https://perma.cc/NPX8-9LV5]. 
131 Although there are individual examples of successes, this approach was largely deemed 
inefficient. One serious mistake was that Russians trained the dogs on their own diesel-engine 
tanks, rather than on German gasoline-engine tanks. As a result, armed dogs would seek out the 
familiar-smelling Russian tanks on the battlefield. See CHRIS BISHOP, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
WEAPONS OF WORLD WAR II 205 (2002). 
132 See, e.g., Military Working Dogs, Army Reg. 190-12 (2013) (discussing the Military Working 
Dogs Program); Marine Mammal Program, U.S. NAVY, 
http://www.public.navy.mil/spawar/Pacific/technology/Pages/mammals.aspx (last visited May 4, 
2018) [https://perma.cc/8C5W-SPL3]. 
133 Nowrot, supra note 127, at 135 (“[D]espite the fact that certain animals are quite frequently 
allowed or required to ‘participate directly in hostilities’ . . . they are not granted the rights and do 
not have the obligations deriving from the legal status of combatants under international 
humanitarian law.”). 
134 Cf. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 78, art. 4(a) (limiting prisoners of war to “persons” 
belonging to various categories). 
135 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices 
(Protocol II) art. 7(1), Oct. 10, 1980, S. TREATY DOC. No. 105-1, 2048 U.N.T.S. 133 (amended 
May 3, 1996). Animals that are not associated with military forces are protected generally as 
civilian objects. See, e.g., First Additional Protocol, supra note 8, art. 54 (prohibiting the 
destruction and removal of livestock as “objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian 
population”). 
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civilian school bus or ambulance, resulting in civilian death. In the Middle Ages, 
it was not unheard of to hold animals accountable for their tortious and criminal 
actions.136 A dog was imprisoned for a year;137 a milk cow was killed for 
murdering a pregnant woman;138 more than once, pigs were condemned to death 
for infanticide.139 Today, these practices seem ludicrous. But it is unclear whether 
any other entity would be held responsible for the animal’s actions.140 
2. The limits of the animal combatant analogy 
In many ways, animals are the best analogy for autonomous weapon 
systems. They are not quite weapons, insofar as they are capable of independent 
and unpredictable action. They are not quite combatants: they cannot be taught 
the law of armed conflict, and they cannot act with the requisite mens rea for 
criminal liability. Their independence is tempered through extensive training; 
their propensity for unpredictable action is addressed through limited use.  
While the animal analogy is conceptually useful,141 there is no 
international “law of animal combatants.” The lack of explicit prohibitions or 
regulations suggests that sovereign states may do what they wish, providing little 
guidance regarding appropriate international regulatory standards for autonomous 
weapon systems.142  
                                                 
136 See William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like To Try a Rat?, 143 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1889 (1995) (discussing the animal trials of the Middle Ages). According to Ewald, 
“[f]rom the ninth century to the nineteenth, in Western Europe, there are over two hundred well-
recorded cases of trials of animals.” Id. at 1903. Nor did human plaintiffs always prevail: suits 
against animals were dismissed, sometimes on procedural and sometimes on substantive grounds. 
Id. at 1898–99 (discussing the 1522 trial of the rats for having eaten and wantonly destroyed 
barley crops—when the rats failed to appear in court after the first and second summons, their 
advocate successfully argued that they had not received adequate notice); id. 1902–03 (discussing 
the 1545 and 1587 trials of snout-beetles for infesting vineyards—the original suit was dismissed 
on the grounds that God had provided sustenance for all of his creatures). 
137 Id. at 1905. 
138 Id. at 1904. 
139 Id. 
140 But see Nowrot, supra note 127, at 142 (suggesting that human handlers would be held 
accountable for the acts of animal combatants). 
141 Heather Roff and David Danks discuss the pros and cons of incorporating “AWS liaisons” in 
military forces, building off of existing practices regarding animals and human handlers. Heather 
M. Roff & David Danks, The Necessity and Limits of Trust in Autonomous Weapon Systems, 17 J. 
MIL. ETHICS (forthcoming 2018). 
142 The Lotus court established the principle that state actions not expressly prohibited under 
international law are permitted. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, 
at 18 (Sept. 7) (“Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot . . . be presumed.”). But see 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 
404 ¶ 8 (July 22) (declaration of Simma. J.) (criticizing the Lotus principle as an outdated and 
“excessively deferential” approach). 
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IV. The Limits of Analogy 
Many have argued that existing international humanitarian law can 
address the regulatory challenges raised by autonomous weapon systems,143 in 
part because most autonomous weapon systems in use today can be analogized to 
other weapons. But the analogy that works today will not necessarily work 
tomorrow. Weapon systems with greater levels of autonomy and in-field learning 
capabilities are being developed, prompting the question of how long the weapon 
analogy will remain accurate or useful. Meanwhile, the combatant, child soldier, 
and animal combatant analogies misrepresent other important characteristics. 
Collectively, these analogies constrain how we think about autonomous weapon 
systems, thereby impeding our ability to craft appropriate regulations. 
A.  Analogies Are Misleading 
All of the aforementioned analogies misrepresent legally salient traits of 
autonomous weapon systems: the weapon analogy minimizes their capacity for 
independent action, while the combatant, child soldier, and animal analogies 
overemphasize it. 
As with definitions that would lump landmines and Skynet in the same 
category,144 the weapon analogy “almost certainly [misses] the essence of what is 
new about autonomous weapons.”145 Autonomous weapon systems are 
fundamentally different from inert, automated, and semi-autonomous weapons 
because of their ability to independently select and engage targets. In addition to 
the moral questions raised by partially delegating life and death decisions to 
algorithms, this capacity raises legal issues that simply are not addressed by the 
existing law governing weapons. 
                                                 
143 Charlie Dunlap, for example, has long argued that “the best way to regulate any weapon (to 
include autonomous and other high-tech weapons) is by insisting that it strictly adhere to the 
existing law of war (as opposed to trying to create a specialized legal regime for every new 
technology that appears).” Charlie Dunlap, Autonomous Weapons and the Law: The Yale and 
Brookings Discussions, LAWFIRE (Apr. 9, 2018), 
https://sites.duke.edu/lawfire/2018/04/09/autonomous-weapons-and-the-law-the-yale-and-
brookings-discussions/ [https://perma.cc/X8ZH-BWXK]; see also Charlie Dunlap, A Better Way 
to Protect Civilians and Combatants Than Weapons Bans: Strict Adherence to the Core Principles 
of the Law of War, LAWFIRE (Dec. 3, 2015), https://sites.duke.edu/lawfire/2015/12/03/a-better-
way-to-protect-civilians-and-combatants-than-weapons-bans-strict-adherence-to-the-core-
principles-of-the-law-of-war-2/ [https://perma.cc/2LK6-ANVR]. 
144 See Crootof, supra note 2, at 1851–52; THE TERMINATOR, supra note 3 (including Skynet, a 
self-aware artificial superintelligence). 
145 Paul Scharre, Autonomy, “Killer Robots,” and Human Control in the Use of Force—Part I, 
JUST SECURITY (July 9, 2014), http://justsecurity.org/12708/autonomy-killer-robots-human-
control-force-part/ [https://perma.cc/2P3H-KLC9].   
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Meanwhile, the combatant, child soldier, and animal analogies 
inappropriately characterize autonomous weapon systems as fully independent 
entities. Unlike combatants, child soldiers, and animals—who may be coerced or 
tricked but nevertheless retain a fundamental degree of autonomy—autonomous 
weapon systems may have their ability to act independently sharply curtailed. The 
actions of autonomous weapon systems are based on algorithms, and algorithms 
may be rewritten. Autonomous weapon systems may be operated solely in semi-
autonomous or even automatic modes by their deployers, or they may be hacked 
and completely controlled by an enemy.146  
B.  Analogies Are Constraining 
Analogies are also inherently constraining, in that they restrict our ability 
to think imaginatively about a new technology. Consider the use of the term 
“driverless cars” to describe autonomous vehicles. The inherent analogy 
normalizes something new and dangerous, but it also restricts our understanding 
and imagination. There is no reason to think autonomous vehicles will look or 
operate anything like existing cars, just as early cars did not look or operate like 
“horseless carriages.” An autonomous vehicle need not have a steering wheel or 
other means of human interaction with the system. And conceiving of 
autonomous vehicles as driverless cars locks one into a host of existing 
assumptions, instead of allowing for more imaginative conceptions of what the 
technology might permit. For example, rather than being individually owned and 
operated property, autonomous vehicles could operate as connected nodes on a 
“smart highway” or as a leasable service.147 Similarly, thinking of autonomous 
weapon systems as a single, independent, embodied entity—be it a weapon, 
combatant, child, or animal—prevents us from imagining what other forms they 
might take.  
One possibility is that autonomous weapon systems will be a collection of 
networked systems. The U.S. Navy’s LOCUST (low-cost UAV swarming 
technology) can already launch up to thirty small drones that communicate with 
each other to fly in formation and engage in “defensive or offensive missions.”148 
Now imagine vast systems of widespread sensors; unmanned aerial, underwater, 
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or surface vehicles; and central “brains”: each component, individually, might not 
constitute an autonomous weapon nor present much of a challenge for traditional 
legal reviews of new weaponry, but collectively this system would enable an 
entirely new means of waging war. 
Alternatively, autonomous weapon systems might take the form of 
“centaur corps,” human-machine teams designed to leverage the strengths of both 
entities.149 An AI system named ALPHA made headlines for besting a retired 
U.S. Air Force colonel in multiple flight simulator trials, but it was designed to 
assist, rather than replace, human pilots, either by providing real-time advice or 
by flying protective “wingmen” UAVs.150 States also continue to invest in 
research and development of powered, armored exoskeleton suits like the U.S. 
Special Operations Command’s Tactical Assault Light Operator Suit (TALOS), 
designed with power-assisted limbs, 360-degree night vision sensors, and open 
architecture that will allow for a variety of add-on capabilities.151 Accordingly, 
some have argued that it may be necessary to expand the legal review for new 
weapons to encompass augmented or cyborg combatants.152  
Autonomous weapon systems need not be embodied at all: autonomous 
cyberweapons are already widely deployed,153 and the speed of cyber will nearly 
always require that countermeasures be automated or autonomous to be 
effective.154 And while physical autonomous weapon systems used for defensive 
purposes are relatively uncontroversial—indeed, ban advocates usually exempt 
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such systems from their definition of autonomous weapon systems altogether155—
autonomous defensive cyberweapons will likely encourage states to develop 
autonomous offensive cyberweapons.156 Furthermore, there is “an important 
dimension to malware that does not have an analogy in physical weapons”: the 
ease with which cyberweapons can self-replicate and spread.157 
By misrepresenting legally salient traits and by limiting our ability to 
imagine future developments, analogies can sometimes impede our ability to 
appropriately regulate new technology. Instead of borrowing from different legal 
regimes and relying on analogical reasoning to create a patchwork of regulations 
for autonomous weapon systems,158 we should instead acknowledge the 
fundamentally distinct nature of these new warfighters and create appropriate, 
supplemental law. 
Conclusion 
While analogical reasoning allows “most law-of-war rules [to] apply most 
of the time to most new technologies,”159 in some situations there is no way to 
credibly stretch existing rules to answer novel legal questions. Autonomous 
weapon systems raise a host of issues that cannot be addressed by analogical 
reasoning, as all potential analogies misrepresent legally salient traits. Conceiving 
of autonomous weapon systems merely as weapons minimizes their capacity for 
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independent and self-determined action, while the combatant, child soldier, and 
animal combatant comparisons overemphasize it. Furthermore, all of these 
discrete and embodied analogies limit our ability to think imaginatively about this 
new technology and anticipate how it might develop, thereby impeding our ability 
to properly regulate it.  
We cannot simply graft legal regimes designed to regulate weapons or 
human combatants onto autonomous weapon systems. Instead, as is often the case 
when there is no appropriate analogy, it is time to explicitly revise rules or create 
entirely new ones to address the specific situations where extant law is 
insufficient. We need to develop standards for both the training and the legal 
review of increasingly independent autonomous weapon systems,160 and we 
should outline accountability mechanisms for their generally inevitable but 
individually unforeseeable accidents.161 More broadly, we should be having a 
larger conversation about the amount of human oversight, control, or judgment 
necessary in the targeting process for all attacks. 
The sooner we acknowledge the insufficiency of existing analogies, the 
sooner we can create appropriate and effective regulations for autonomous 
weapon systems. 
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